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COOPERATION OR COERCION?: WHY SELECTIVE WAIVER IS 
NEEDED IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of federal legislation and government crackdowns on white 
collar crime and securities laws violations, the legal environment in which 
attorney-client and work-product privileges are asserted is changing 
dramatically.1  Internal investigations are commonplace in corporations today.2  
Corporate scandals from Enron to WorldCom to Tyco and others have 
prompted companies to call on the assistance of attorneys to conduct internal 
investigations of alleged improprieties.3  In turn, prosecutors and regulators 
have great discretion in deciding whether to bring charges against corporations 
for wrongdoing,4 and they can place tremendous pressure on corporations to 
cooperate with the government in order to receive favorable treatment.5 
The government frequently requires companies to waive attorney-client 
and work-product privileges and to turn over the results of their internal 
investigations as a condition of leniency.6  For example, the current guidelines 
from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) regarding criminal charges against 
corporations “go out of their way to emphasize that a corporation’s willingness 
 
 1. Richard M. Strassberg & Sarah E. Walters, Is Selective Waiver of Privilege Viable?, 
N.Y. L.J. (July 7, 2003); see also Robert S. Litt, Unsealing the Lawyer’s Lips: The Changing 
Contours of Attorney-Client Privilege in an Era of Corporate Fraud, CRIM. LITIG. NEWSLETTER 
(A.B.A. Section of Litig.: Comm. on Criminal Litig., Chicago, Ill.), at 6. 
 2. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1. 
 3. Id; see Zach Dostart, Selective Disclosure: The Abrogation of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 731 (2006) (recognizing that 
most corporations will conduct internal investigations when faced with allegations of 
wrongdoing); see also Litt, supra note 1, at 6 (“The downfall of Enron, WorldCom and other 
companies, and the ensuing investigations, brought about a new focus on corporate governance 
and the role of the company’s lawyer in the face of a possible fraud.”). 
 4. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1.  Incentives in sentencing guidelines provide federal 
prosecutors with a blueprint for deciding when a company “should be indicted based in part on 
the quality of the corporation’s cooperation with a government investigation.”  David M. Zornow 
& Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate 
Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 154 (2000). 
 5. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1; Litt, supra note 1, at 6; see also  Zornow & Krakaur, 
supra note 4, at 147  (“[T]he client’s rights of confidentiality . . . are giving way to the 
government’s powerful demands for the swift disclosure of all evidence relevant to its 
investigations of corporate misconduct.”). 
 6. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1; Litt, supra note 1, at 6. 
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to waive both the attorney-client and work-product privileges with respect to 
internal investigations is an important factor that prosecutors will weigh in 
assessing whether a company has effectively cooperated and therefore should 
be afforded any leniency.”7  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
also considers waiver of privileges in determining whether a corporation has 
cooperated.8  In fact, the SEC goes even further than the DOJ in its policies.  
Not only is cooperation a condition of leniency in most cases, but corporations 
may also be penalized for a perceived lack of cooperation with SEC 
investigations.9  This includes a corporation’s refusal to waive its privileges.10 
Thus, the decision of whether to waive privilege is both difficult and 
complicated.11  Corporations have incentives to waive privilege to gain 
leniency, though revealing their wrongdoing may subject them to 
punishment.12  Yet the consequences of waiver extend far beyond the limits of 
a government investigation.13  Corporations have reason to fear that disclosure 
of privileged information may result in a “full-scale waiver” as to future civil 
litigants.14 
It is a fair bet that any civil lawsuits that follow a government investigation are 
sure to request the disclosure of any internal investigation, and if the privilege 
no longer applies, the company may find itself handing over to civil plaintiffs a 
virtual road map to assist them in their lawsuit.15 
Because of this, corporations as well as government agencies, are calling 
for a doctrine of selective or limited waiver, which would allow companies to 
 
 7. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1; see Memorandum from Deputy Att’y Gen. Larry D. 
Thompson to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys on Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/ 
cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memo]; Richard Ben-Veniste & Lee H. 
Rubin, DOJ Reaffirms and Expands Aggressive Corporate Cooperation Guidelines, 18 LEGAL 
BACKGROUNDER No. 11, 1 (Apr. 4, 2003) (noting that the Thompson Memo provides guidance to 
prosecutors and defense attorneys concerning the guidelines that direct the Department when 
deciding whether to bring charges against a company). 
 8. Litt, supra note 1, at 6; see Report of Investigation Pursuant to § 21(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency 
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm [hereinafter Seaboard Report] (listing 
several criteria that it considers in determining whether to reward self-reporting). 
 9. Michael H. Dore, A Matter of Fairness: The Need for a New Look at Selective Waiver in 
SEC Investigations, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 761, 761 (2006). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1; Litt, supra note 1, at 7. 
 12. Litt, supra note 1, at 7. 
 13. See Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1; Litt, supra note 1, at 7. 
 14. Litt, supra note 1, at 7. 
 15. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1. 
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cooperate with the government without waiving privilege as to other parties.16  
In fact, corporations are entering into confidentiality agreements with 
government agencies which allow them to disclose privileged information to 
the government without waiving privilege as to any third parties who might 
later seek to discover such information.17  The United States Courts of Appeal 
currently are split on whether corporations’ disclosure of privileged 
information to the government waives privilege as to third-party civil litigants 
and whether confidentiality agreements are effective to maintain privilege as to 
these third parties.18 
Part I of this Note will introduce the history of this circuit split, providing 
holdings and rationales from every circuit that has issued a ruling on this 
question.  Part I will also address the law concerning the attorney-client and 
work-product privileges and waivers of both privileges generally.  Part II 
critiques the various rulings of the courts and analyzes the policy rationale for 
allowing a selective waiver in government investigations as well as the future 
of such a doctrine.  This Note concludes that confidentiality agreements 
allowing a limited waiver for disclosures to government agencies should be 
upheld for reasons of fairness and public policy concerns. 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF PRIVILEGES AND CIRCUIT SPLIT ON SELECTIVE 
WAIVER 
A. Attorney-Client Privilege 
Attorney-client privilege is the oldest common law privilege for 
confidential information.19  “Its purpose is to encourage full and frank 
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote 
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice.”20  In the interests of justice, the privilege is necessary because 
attorneys must be able to assist their clients “free from the consequences or the 
apprehension of disclosure.”21 
 
 16. See id. 
 17. Nolan Mitchell, Preserving the Privilege: Codification of Selective Waiver and the 
Limits of Federal Power Over State Courts, 86 B.U. L. REV. 691, 697 (2006). 
 18. Strassberg & Walters, supra note 1.  As a result of the circuit split concerning 
confidentiality agreements, corporations face a great deal of uncertainty about whether their 
confidentiality agreements will be invalidated.  Dore, supra note 9, at 762; Mitchell, supra note 
17, at 697–98. 
 19. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 
(Edward W. Cleary, ed., 2d ed. 1972) (“The proposition is that the detriment to justice from a 
power to shut off inquiry to pertinent facts in court, will be outweighed by the benefits to justice 
(not to the client) from a franker disclosure in the lawyer’s office.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1294 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1291 
Because the privilege effectively withholds material information from the 
fact-finder, it is applicable only when necessary to accomplish its purpose.22 
Attorney-client privilege is construed narrowly, and “protects only those 
disclosures—necessary to obtain informed legal advice—which might not have 
been made absent the privilege.”23  Confidentiality is the key factor of the 
privilege, therefore if a party voluntarily discloses otherwise privileged 
information to a third-party, he loses the protection of attorney-client 
privilege.24  It has long been recognized that voluntary disclosure to a third 
party is inconsistent with the privilege.25  “If clients themselves divulge such 
information to third parties, chances are that they would also have divulged it 
to their attorneys, even without the protection of the privilege.  Thus, once a 
client has revealed privileged information to a third party, the basic 
justification for the privilege no longer applies . . . .”26 
1. Selective Waiver Approved 
The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit that has adopted selective waiver for 
attorney-client privilege.27  In fact, it was the Eighth Circuit that developed the 
notion of selective waiver in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith in 1977. 28  
In that case, when defending a civil action, Diversified claimed attorney-client 
privilege for a memorandum and report prepared by its counsel that was 
previously produced to the SEC in response to a subpoena by the agency.29  
The court addressed the issue in a single paragraph, concluding that only a 
limited waiver of privilege had occurred.30  It declared that “[t]o hold 
otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the developing procedure of 
corporations to employ independent outside counsel to investigate and advise 
them in order to protect stockholders, potential stockholders and customers.”31 
 
 22. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). 
 23. Id. 
 24. In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 25. United States v. Bernard, 877 F.2d 1463, 1465 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. AT&T 
Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 26. Comment, Stuffing the Rabbit Back into the Hat: Limited Waiver of the Attorney-Client 
Privilege in an Administrative Agency Investigation, 130  U. PA. L. REV. 1198, 1207 (1982).  
However, courts have allowed disclosure to third parties where such disclosure still serves the 
underlying purpose of the doctrine.  See Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184–85 (9th 
Cir. 1965) (holding that clients may disclose information to co-defendants or co-litigants). 
 27. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977).   
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 599. 
 30. Id. at 611. 
 31. Id. 
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2. No Selective Waiver 
The D.C. Circuit was the first circuit to consider selective waiver after 
Diversified.  In Permian Corporation v. United States,32 the Department of 
Energy requested documents from the SEC which the SEC had previously 
received from the corporation.33  The company had voluntarily turned over the 
documents to the SEC in connection with an investigation involving possible 
illegal bribes to foreign officials and tax fraud.34  Considering the purpose of 
the attorney-client privilege, the court found the doctrine of selective waiver to 
be “wholly unpersuasive.”35  The court decided that the availability of a limited 
waiver would not serve the interests underlying attorney-client privilege.36  It 
determined that although “[v]oluntary cooperation with government 
investigations may be a laudable activity,” it is hard to comprehend how this 
improves the attorney-client privilege.37  It concluded that “[i]f the client feels 
the need to keep his communications with his attorney confidential, he is free 
to do so under the traditional rule by consistently asserting the privilege, even 
when the discovery request comes from a ‘friendly’ agency.”38 
The court also held that “[t]he client cannot be permitted to pick and 
choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting 
the claim of confidentiality to obstruct others, or to invoke the privilege as to 
communications whose confidentiality he has already compromised for his 
own benefit.”39  It determined that attorney-client privilege should only be 
available to a client who wants to maintain genuine confidentiality.40  It 
concluded that the corporation destroyed the confidentiality of its attorney-
client communications when it disclosed them to the SEC.41  The First, 
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits have also rejected selective waiver for 
attorney-client privilege, using reasoning similar to that in Permian.42 
 
 32. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 33. Id. at 1216–17. 
 34. Id. at 1216. 
 35. Id. at 1220. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1222. 
 41. Id. at 1219; see also In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (reiterating the Circuit’s position and holding that the privilege should only be available for 
a litigant who wants to maintain genuine confidentiality). 
 42. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir. 
1991) (holding that selective waiver does not further the interest of attorney-client privilege; it 
merely promotes voluntary disclosure to the government, which extends the privilege beyond its 
intended purpose); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988) (rejecting 
a limited waiver of attorney-client privilege where a corporation had previously disclosed 
documents to the government in an effort to settle a criminal investigation against it); John Doe 
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In 2002, the Sixth Circuit issued a comprehensive opinion on the issue in 
In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation Billing Practices Litigation.43  
In that case, civil plaintiffs sought documents that the corporation previously 
provided to the DOJ and other government agencies.44  The court rejected the 
doctrine of selective waiver in any form.45  It held that the approach adopted in 
Diversified had little, if any, connection “to fostering frank communication 
between a client and his . . . attorney.”46  The court concluded that all forms of 
selective waiver, even those which stem from confidentiality agreements, alter 
the attorney-client privilege into “merely another brush on an attorney’s 
palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or strategic advantage.”47  The 
court admitted that a selective waiver rule would further the search for truth, 
promote substantial investigative efficiencies, encourage settlements, and 
potentially increase corporate self-policing.48  Thus, it recognized the appeal 
and justification for permitting cooperation with the government, but 
determined that the purpose of attorney-client privilege should not be thwarted 
by imposition of selective waiver.49 
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Boggs argued that because the harms of 
selective disclosure are not clear, the benefits to the government of sharing 
information should prevail.50  Judge Boggs concluded that the court’s choice is 
not a decision whether to release privileged information to third party civil 
litigants which was already disclosed to the government; rather the choice is 
whether to create incentives that permit voluntary disclosures to the 
government at all.51  He noted that “[i]n the run of cases, either the government 
 
Corp. v. United States, 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982) (rejecting a “pick and choose” theory of 
attorney-client privilege and expressly adopting the reasoning in Permian, while noting that the 
case before it was somewhat stronger because it did not involve a confidentiality agreement with 
the corporation and a government agency); see also United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 
F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir. 1997).  The First Circuit commented: 
  Anyone who chooses to disclose a privileged document to a third party, or does so 
pursuant to a prior agreement or understanding, has an incentive to do so, whether for 
gain or to avoid disadvantage.  It would be perfectly possible to carve out some of those 
disclosures and say that, although the disclosure itself is not necessary to foster attorney-
client communications, neither does it forfeit the privilege.  With rare exceptions, courts 
have been unwilling to start down this path—which has no logical terminus—and we join 
in this reluctance. 
Id. 
 43. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 44. Id. at 292–93. 
 45. Id. at 302. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (quoting In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 48. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 293 F.3d at 303. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 311. 
 51. Id. at 312. 
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gets the disclosure made palatable because of the exception, or neither the 
government nor any private party becomes privy to the privileged material.”52  
Judge Boggs asserted that there is great importance in allowing the government 
increased access to privileged information that it otherwise would not be able 
to secure.53  Thus, allowing a limited waiver to government agencies would 
advance public interest by “bringing violations of the law to light.”54 
B. Work-Product Privilege55 
The purpose underlying the work-product doctrine is notably different 
from that of attorney-client privilege.56  Whereas the goal of attorney-client 
privilege is to protect the confidentiality of communications between an 
attorney and a client, the work-product doctrine is designed to promote the 
adversarial system by shielding information prepared by attorneys in 
anticipation of litigation.57  The United States Supreme Court created this 
doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor, determining that “it is essential that a lawyer 
work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by 
opposing parties and their counsel.”58  The court reiterated that it is important 
for attorneys to act on behalf of their clients without worrying that their 
adversaries will discover their tactics.59  As explained by one commentator: 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 293 F.3d at 311. 
 54. Id. at 312–13. 
 55. This is not a true privilege because opponents can receive access to the information if the 
requirements of the rule are met.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 
(1947). 
 56. Dostart, supra note 3, at 730 (“Although both the attorney-client privilege and the work 
product doctrine are derived from common law, they have significant differences.”). 
 57. Dore, supra note 9, at 764; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 699–700.  The doctrine was later 
codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which state that a party may discover materials 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that 
other party's representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, 
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has 
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is 
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by 
other means. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
 58. 329 U.S. at 510.  The Hickman Court further explained that the work product doctrine 
permits an attorney to “assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the 
irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless 
interference.”  Id. at 511. 
 59. Id. at 510–11; see Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 4, at 150 (“[W]ork product doctrine is 
based on ‘the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims’—the 
notion that, in an adversary system, an attorney should not be obliged to share her work with her 
client’s adversary.”) (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510). 
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The natural jealousy of the lawyer for the privacy of his file, and the courts’ 
desire to protect the effectiveness of the lawyer’s work as the manager of 
litigation, have found expression, not only as we have seen in the evidential 
privilege for confidential lawyer-client communications, but in rules and 
practices about the various forms of pretrial discovery.60 
Because the purpose of this privilege differs from attorney-client privilege, 
the waiver rules differ as well.61  The work-product doctrine is designed to 
protect the adversarial system and is not concerned with a client’s ability to 
receive confidential legal advice.62  Thus, a party does not automatically lose 
the protection of the privilege by making a disclosure to a third- party.63  If, 
however, the disclosure gives an adversary access to the information, most 
courts hold that the protection of the privilege is waived.64 
1. Selective Waiver Approved 
The Fourth Circuit is the only circuit to approve selective waiver for the 
work-product privilege.65  However, it has limited the use of selective waiver 
to cases involving only opinion work product.66  The court held that the waiver 
was comprehensive when the company made testimonial use of non-opinion 
work product by disclosing it to the government.67  The court extended 
selective waiver to opinion work product for two reasons.68  First, the court 
concluded that opinion work product has received great protection by courts.69  
It noted that “the plain language of [FED. R. CIV. P.] 26(b)(3) suggests especial 
protection for opinion work product[.]”70  Second, the Court determined that in 
a trial, there is little risk that a party “will attempt to use a pure mental 
impression or legal theory as a sword and as a shield . . . so as to distort the 
factfinding process.”71  Therefore, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district 
court’s ruling concerning work-product protection.72 
 
 60. The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal 
Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REV. 307, 313 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 96 
(Edward W. Cleary, ed., 2d ed. 1972)). 
 61. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 62. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 700. 
 63. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1428. 
 64. Id.; see also 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2024 (1994). 
 65. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, 856 F.2d 619, 626–27 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 66. Id. at 626. 
 67. Id. at 625. 
 68. Id. at 626. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Martin Marietta Corp, 856 F.2d at 626. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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2. No Selective Waiver 
Ironically, the circuit that created the concept of selective waiver and 
applied it to attorney-client privilege, has rejected the doctrine in the work-
product arena.73  In Chrysler Motors, a company produced a computer tape to 
its adversaries in civil litigation during settlement negotiations under a 
confidentiality agreement.74  The U.S. Attorney later sought production of 
these tapes, and the company refused to produce them.75  The Eighth Circuit 
held that “Chrysler waived any work-product protection by voluntarily 
disclosing the computer tape to its adversaries . . . .”76  It also held that the 
company’s confidentiality agreement was irrelevant, because the determinative 
factor was that the materials were not kept confidential.77 
Focusing on the purpose of privilege, the Third Circuit ruled that work-
product privilege may be retained when disclosure furthers the interests 
underlying the doctrine.78  However, the court noted: 
[w]hen a party discloses protected materials to a government agency 
investigating allegations against it, it uses those materials to forestall 
prosecution (if the charges are unfounded) or to obtain lenient treatment (in the 
case of well-founded allegations).  These objectives, however rational, are 
foreign to the objectives underlying the work product doctrine.79 
The court held that attorneys are free to prepare their cases without fearing 
disclosure to their opponents as long as they and their clients refrain from 
disclosing privileged materials themselves.80  Likewise, the Sixth Circuit held 
that most of the rationale for disallowing selective waiver in the attorney-client 
contexts extends to work product as well.81  Work product allows an attorney 
to prepare his case in confidence.82  Thus, the goal underlying this doctrine 
“has little to do with talking to the Government.”83 
Finally, as noted above, the Fourth Circuit refused to apply selective 
waiver to non-opinion work product, even though it did adopt selective waiver 
for opinion work product.84  The First Circuit issued the same ruling as the 
 
 73. Chrysler Motors Corp.  Overnight Evaluation Program Litig., 860 F.2d 844, 846 (8th 
Cir. 1988).  The Chrysler court did not discuss Diversified in reaching its decision to deny a 
selective waiver. 
 74. Id. at 845. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 846. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1429 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 293 F.3d 289, 306 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988). 
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Fourth regarding selective waiver and opinion work product, holding that “it 
would take better reason than we have to depart from the prevailing rule that 
disclosure to an adversary, real or potential, forfeits work product 
protection.”85 
3. Case-by-Case Approach to Selective Waiver 
In In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit held that documents that the 
company had previously produced to the SEC were not protected work 
product.86  There, the record did not establish that the company entered into a 
confidentiality agreement with the SEC.87  The court determined that any 
governmental agency has the power to expressly agree to any disclosure 
limitations to other agencies, as long as it does not violate their duties under 
the law.88  However, it held that courts should not imply an agreement where 
the parties did not expressly make such an agreement.89 
Applying In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit rejected another claim of 
selective waiver for work product in In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum.90  
However, the court did not reject the selective waiver doctrine under all 
circumstances.91  It limited its rejection to the circumstances of that case.92  Its 
decision was based on three factors: (1) the proposed use of work-product 
protection was not consistent with the purpose of the doctrine; (2) the 
appellants did not have a rational basis for believing that the SEC would keep 
the disclosed documents confidential; and (3) applying waiver “would not 
trench on any policy elements now inherent in this [protection].”93  The court 
noted that the company chose to participate in the SEC’s voluntary disclosure 
program.94  It concluded that this decision was obviously motivated by self-
interest.95  The appellants wanted to claim work-product protection for the 
same disclosures against different adversaries in suits based on the very same 
matters disclosed to the SEC.96  The court held that “[i]t would be inconsistent 
and unfair to allow appellants to select according to their own self-interest to 
which adversaries they will allow access to the materials.”97  The court 
 
 85. United States v. Mass. Inst. Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 687 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 86. 676 F.2d 793, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 87. Id. at 820. 
 88. Id. at 824. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 738 F.2d 1367, 1371–72 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 91. Id. at 1372. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. In re Subpoenas, 738 F.2d at 1372. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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reiterated that the company failed to ensure by agreement that the SEC would 
not disclose the materials.98 
Likewise, in In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., the Second Circuit denied 
mandamus relief to defendants alleging work-product protection for a 
memorandum previously disclosed to the SEC.99  However, in denying the 
petition, the court refused “to adopt a per se rule that all voluntary disclosures 
to the government waive work product protection.”100  The court held that the 
issue should be decided on a case-by-case basis.101  It noted that a per se rule 
“would fail to anticipate situations . . . in which the SEC and the disclosing 
party have entered into an explicit agreement that the SEC will maintain the 
confidentiality of the disclosed materials.”102 
C. Other Notable Cases 
In one of the most illustrative state court opinions on the issue, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery upheld selective waiver for attorney-client 
privileged communication.103  In Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., a shareholder 
requested documents that McKesson previously disclosed to the SEC pursuant 
to a confidentiality agreement.104  The court concluded that when companies 
disclose privileged information after securing a confidentiality agreement, they 
gain a heightened expectation of privacy.105  The court expressly responded to 
the Sixth Circuit’s fairness argument by asserting that third-party litigants are 
not disadvantaged with a waiver rule.106  It asserted that civil litigants are in no 
worse position than had disclosure never been made.107  The court also noted 
that a selective waiver rule would encourage corporate compliance and benefit 
law enforcement.108 
In a subsequent and related case, the District Court for the Northern 
District of California followed the Delaware Court ruling and upheld selective 
waiver for work product in In re McKesson HBOC, Inc.109  The court relied 
substantially on Judge Boggs’s dissent in In re Columbia/HCA in reaching its 
decision.110  In issuing its ruling, the court emphasized the distinction between 
 
 98. Id. at 1375. 
 99. 9 F.3d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 100. Id. at 236. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 
13, 2002), aff’d, No. 18554, 2005 WL 583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005). 
 104. Id. at *1. 
 105. Id. at *6. 
 106. Id. at *9–10. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Saito, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8. 
 109. No. 99-CV-20743, 2005 WL 934331, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005). 
 110. Id. at *9. 
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disclosure to private parties and disclosure to a government agency pursuant to 
a confidentiality agreement.111  It concluded that in the former case a waiver 
would clearly result, while the privilege should be upheld in the latter case.112 
D. Tenth Circuit Issues Overall Refusal of Selective Waiver 
In the most recent selective waiver case, the Tenth Circuit issued a 
comprehensive opinion rejecting selective waiver under all circumstances.113  
In a consolidated securities class action against Qwest, the lead plaintiffs 
requested pretrial production of documents.114  Qwest claimed that the 
documents were protected by the attorney-client and work-product 
privileges.115  These documents were previously produced to the SEC and DOJ 
pursuant to subpoena and confidentiality agreements between Qwest and the 
agencies during an investigation of the corporation’s business practices.116  The 
agreements provided that Qwest did not intend to waive attorney-client 
privilege or work-product privilege as to the documents, and the SEC and DOJ 
agreed not to disclose the documents to any third party unless the agencies 
determined that disclosure was required by law and “would be in furtherance 
of the [agencies’] discharge of its duties and responsibilities.”117  The court 
held that the confidentiality agreements do not support an adoption of selective 
waiver.118  The court reasoned that the agreements gave the agencies broad 
discretion to use the disclosed documents as they saw fit.119 
Qwest urged the court to adopt a “selective waiver,” which would allow 
production of the privileged documents to the DOJ and SEC without waiving 
the privilege as to third party civil litigants.120  Considering the purposes 
behind the attorney-client and the work-product doctrine, the court refused to 
adopt a selective waiver doctrine as an exception to the general waiver rules.121  
The court also concluded that “[t]he record [did] not establish a need for a rule 
of selective waiver to assure cooperation with law enforcement, to further the 
purposes of the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, or to avoid 
unfairness to the disclosing party.”122  The court noted that what Qwest was 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.  The Court did not uphold the attorney-client privilege in this case because McKesson 
agreed to disclose the information before any communications were even made to the attorneys.  
Id. at *3. 
 113. In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 114. Id. at 1182. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1181. 
 117. Id. (citing Pet’r Br., Ex. B at 1). 
 118. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1194. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1181. 
 121. Id. at 1192. 
 122. Id. 
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requesting was really a whole new privilege: a “government-investigation 
privilege.”123  The court was unwilling to create this new privilege.124 
The court did not accept Qwest’s argument that selective waiver is 
necessary to ensure cooperation with law enforcement.125  It determined that 
“companies will cease cooperating with law enforcement absent protection 
under the selective waiver doctrine,” noting that Qwest turned over documents 
in the face of almost unanimous rejection of the selective waiver by other 
circuits.126  Also, the court noted that the agencies voiced no support for 
Qwest’s position, pointing to the fact that the DOJ wrote a reply brief at the 
court’s request and took no position on the issue of whether a selective waiver 
should be found.127 
The court reasoned that selective waiver does not promote the goals of the 
attorney-client and work-product privileges.128  Selective waiver does not 
promote exchange between the attorney and client, but it would have the 
opposite effect of inhibiting communication.129  The court determined that 
officers and employees would be guarded in the conversations with attorneys if 
they knew that employers could disclose privileged information to the 
government without risking further waiver of attorney-client privilege.130  The 
court also noted that selective waiver does little to further the purpose of the 
work-product doctrine, which is to enable counsel to prepare a case in 
privacy.131  It found that selective waiver may encourage attorneys to prepare 
cases with any eye towards pleasing the government.132 
The court did not accept Qwest’s argument that disallowing selective 
waiver would be unfair to them but not to the civil plaintiffs.133  It decided that 
allowing Qwest to choose which of its adversaries would be privy to privileged 
information is “far from a universally accepted perspective of fairness.”134  It 
noted that Qwest realized an obvious benefit from disclosing the materials to 
the government, “but did so while weighing the risk of waiver.”135 
 
 123. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1192. 
 124. Id.; see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1426 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (also ruling that a new privilege was not necessary to encourage cooperation with the 
government and noting that Westinghouse chose to cooperate despite the absence of an 
established selective waiver privilege). 
 125. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d. at 1193. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1195. 
 129. Id. 
 130. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1195. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1195–96. 
 134. Id. at 1196. 
 135. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1196. 
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III.  SELECTIVE WAIVER SHOULD BE APPROVED 
Although courts have distinguished between the purposes of attorney-
client privilege and work-product privilege, their reasoning for rejecting 
selective waiver for both privileges has been relatively similar.136  The weight 
of authority is clearly against selective waiver, and the courts’ decisions have 
been predominately based on two factors: purpose of the privileges and 
fairness.137  This section will analyze why the courts have reached the wrong 
conclusion when addressing these factors and will argue that a selective waiver 
should be adopted in government investigations when a confidentiality 
agreement has been executed. 
A. Opposing Courts Reach Wrong Conclusion on Goals of Privileges 
Courts rejecting selective waiver have come to the uniform conclusion that 
the doctrine does not support the purposes of the attorney-client and work-
product privileges.138  However, these courts fail to recognize the exact impact 
of selective waivers as well as the public policy arguments which override 
their concerns. 
As courts have reiterated, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to 
encourage “full and frank discussion between attorneys and their clients.”139  
Courts have been firm in ruling that the selective waiver doctrine does not 
advance this purpose, and the Tenth Circuit took it one step further by 
determining that selective waiver actually inhibits the goal of the attorney-
client privilege.140  The Tenth Circuit concluded that employees would be 
discouraged from talking to corporate attorneys if they knew that the attorneys 
could disclose the contents of their conversations to the government without 
risking further disclosure to other parties.141  This argument advanced by the 
Tenth Circuit as well as other opponents of the doctrine is illogical and fails to 
consider the full scope of selective waiver. 
Courts opposing the doctrine have looked at selective waiver only as a tool 
of manipulation for companies to employ whenever it benefits them.  There is 
no doubt that companies do use selective waiver to their advantage.  However, 
courts that oppose selective waiver refuse to recognize that the nature of the 
doctrine itself actually encourages full and frank discussion between corporate 
employees and attorneys.  Given that corporate clients have a great incentive to 
 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 19–135. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id.  But see In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 293 F.3d 289, 308 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(Boggs, J., dissenting) (“It is not clear why an exception to the third-party waiver rule need be 
moored to the justifications of the attorney-client privilege.”) (emphasis in original). 
 139. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see supra text accompanying 
note 21. 
 140. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1195. 
 141. Id. 
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cooperate with government investigations to ensure leniency for the 
corporation, themselves, or both, selective waiver would encourage frank 
discussion between corporate attorneys and clients if clients were assured that 
their communications could not be disclosed to third parties who could later 
sue them.  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that employees would ever be 
discouraged from talking to attorneys when it would clearly be to their 
advantage to do so. 
Although in vehement opposition with most court rulings on the issue, the 
Eighth Circuit, the Delaware Court of Chancery, and the Northern District of 
California were correct in determining that failure to adopt selective waiver 
actually “hindered the corporate attorney’s role as advisor.”142  Specifically, 
the Delaware court concluded that “[w]hen courts amplify the risk of 
disclosure to include future private plaintiffs, the scales begin to tip further in 
favor of corporate noncompliance with investigative agencies.”143  The courts 
found that the goal of the privilege was furthered when companies were 
assured that information disclosed to the government will not in turn be 
disclosed to civil litigants.144 
Additionally, courts ruling against selective waiver have concluded that the 
doctrine does not further attorney-client privilege, but creates an exception for 
communications between the government and corporations.145  These courts 
have come to the wrong conclusion.  Selective waiver does not promote full 
and frank communication between the client and the government; it merely 
allows privileged communications between clients and attorneys to be 
disclosed to the government.146 
Moreover, selective waiver can also promote the goal of the work-product 
privilege.  As noted above, the purpose of this privilege is to ensure that 
attorneys are allowed to prepare their cases in privacy, free from the intrusion 
of their adversaries.147  In explaining the goal of the doctrine, courts have 
articulated that attorneys should not be privy to the work of an adversary.148  
 
 142. Tiffany Seeman, Safeguarding the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Face of Federal 
Securities Regulations, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 309, 335–36 (2006). 
 143. Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 
13, 2002), aff’d, No. 18554, 2005 WL 583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005). 
 144. Seeman, supra note 142, at 336. 
 145. Id. at 338; see, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare, 293 F.3d 289, 302 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(asserting that the privilege was not designed to protect communications between the client and 
the government). 
 146. Seeman, supra note 142, at 338.  This same logic can be applied to the work product 
doctrine as well.  Selective waiver does not encourage companies to prepare their cases for the 
benefit of the government, but it merely allows them to disclose the information which they have 
prepared in anticipation of litigation to the government. 
 147. See supra notes 56–64 and accompanying text. 
 148. See id. 
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Without selective waiver, this is exactly what will happen.  If courts allow 
work-product privileged information to be turned over to third-party civil 
litigants, these litigants would be provided with a blueprint for litigating 
against the disclosing corporations. 
Furthermore, while maintaining and promoting the goals of the substantive 
privileges is laudable, courts have created exceptions for other legal doctrines 
which did not support the goals of those doctrines, particularly when there 
were public policy concerns involved.  For example, in the contracts arena, 
courts have created an exception to the general rule for advertisements.149  
Normally, advertisements are not offers but are mere invitations to negotiate an 
offer, unless there is a public policy reason to bind the advertiser.150  This 
exception does not support the purpose of the substantive law regarding 
advertisements, but exists solely because of issues of fairness and public policy 
concerns.  In the field of torts, there is no duty for an actor to rescue another 
who has not been placed in harm by that actor’s conduct, even if the actor 
should realize that his actions may be necessary to save another.151  However, 
courts will impose an affirmative duty to act based solely on the relationship 
between the actor and the individual in danger.  For example, a parent may 
have a duty to save a child and a husband may have a duty to save his wife.152  
Like the contracts example, the exception does not promote the purpose of the 
substantive privilege concerning a duty to act, but it exists solely for reasons of 
public policy. 
Additionally, within the selective waiver arena, several courts have 
adopted selective waiver for public policy reasons.  As noted above, the Fourth 
Circuit has adopted selective waiver for opinion work product.153  The Second 
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that approval of selective waiver 
may be possible where the company has entered into a confidentiality 
agreement with the government, such that the companies have a reasonable 
expectation that their communications will be kept confidential.154  Finally, the 
Eighth Circuit, the Delaware Court of Chancery, and the Northern District of 
California have expressly adopted selective waiver for attorney-client 
privilege.155  Therefore, it would not be unprecedented or unreasonable for 
 
 149. See, e.g., Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Izadi v. 
Machado Ford, Inc., 550 So. 2d 1135, 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
 150. See e.g., Leonard, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 122–23; Izadi, 550 So. 2d at 1140; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 (1979). 
 151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1963). 
 152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. A (1963). 
 153. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Pollard, 856 F.2d 619, 626 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 154. In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Subpoenas Duces 
Tecum, 738 F.2d 1376, 1371–72 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 155. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978); In re McKesson 
HBOC, Inc., No. 99-CV-20743, 2005 WL 934331, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005); Saito v. 
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courts to approve an exception that would not promote the goal of the 
substantive rule in this case. 
B. Fairness Weighs in Favor of Corporations 
As noted earlier, due to the changing legal landscape concerning corporate 
corruption, companies face ever increasing pressures to waive privilege and 
cooperate with government investigations.  One might argue that the decision 
to waive privilege and disclose information to the government is simply the 
corporation’s choice, and that the companies should live with the consequences 
of their self-serving choice to cooperate with investigations against them.156  
“But for men and women facing the threat of imprisonment, the effective end 
of their professional careers and financial well-being, and the weight of lining 
up against the United States Government, it is not much of a choice.  In many 
ways, cooperation must feel like the only option.”157  Unfortunately for the 
corporations, the majority of courts have not been sympathetic to their plight.  
Courts rejecting selective waiver have held that corporations cannot selectively 
waive privilege as to the government, while maintaining the privilege against 
civil litigants.158  The courts have asserted that corporations should not be 
allowed to manipulate the privileges and “pick and choose” which adversaries 
they are allowed to waive privilege to.159  However, upon closer inspection of 
the SEC and DOJ policies, it appears that the true manipulators are the 
government agencies.  Moreover, the tactics that they are employing are far 
more unfair than selective waiver. 
Many have noted that the SEC considers “cooperation” as a major factor it 
considers when investigating corporations for potential securities violations.160  
An essential part of the cooperation includes whether the particular corporation 
has waived privilege as to the agency.161  “At the same time, the SEC looks 
very unfavorably on a perceived lack of cooperation, threatening targets of 
investigations with penalties and more serious charges.”162 
On October 23, 2001, the SEC released what is now known as the 
“Seaboard Report.”163  The report expressed the SEC’s policy to award 
 
McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002), aff’d, 
No. 18554, 2005 WL 583742 (Del. Mar. 8, 2005). 
 156. Dore, supra note 9, at 783. 
 157. Id. at 783–84; see Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 4, at 156 (“The possible sanctions 
against the corporation if it is deemed to have failed to cooperate ‘thoroughly’ often appear too 
great to justify a battle with prosecutors over privileges.”). 
 158. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 159. See id. 
 160. Dore, supra note 9, at 761; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 692. 
 161. Dore, supra note 9, at 761; Mitchell, supra note 17, at 692. 
 162. Dore, supra note 9, at 761. 
 163. Seaboard Report, supra note 8. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1308 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1291 
leniency to corporations that assisted in their investigations.164  It listed several 
factors as indicators of cooperation; among them is whether the corporation 
voluntarily disclosed otherwise privileged information.165  Unlike previous 
policies issued by the SEC, this report made clear that a perceived lack of 
cooperation could result in severe penalties against a company.166  The report 
also explained why the SEC did not bring charges against the Seaboard 
Corporation for apparent misconduct.167  The SEC did prosecute one of the 
corporate officials, but took no action against the corporation itself.168  The 
SEC articulated that Seaboard’s cooperation, particularly their decision to 
waive attorney-client and work-product privileges, was a factor in not 
prosecuting the company.169  Therefore, due to the great advantage that can 
result from waiving privilege and the significant consequences that may arise 
from lack of participation, it is not hard to understand why cooperation by 
companies may not be truly “voluntary.” 
The DOJ has employed similar tactics.  In June of 1999, Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder, released a memorandum entitled “Bringing Criminal 
Charges Against Corporations,” to the U.S. Attorneys which listed the relevant 
factors that the Department should look to when determining whether to bring 
criminal charges against a corporation.170  Among the factors listed was a 
“corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its 
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if 
necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work product 
privileges.”171  The Holder Memorandum explained that a corporation’s waiver 
of privilege referred to its internal investigations and to communications 
between the officers, directors, and other employees of the company.172  The 
DOJ articulated that these waivers are “critical in enabling the government to 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Dore, supra note 9, at 769–70. 
 167. Seaboard Report, supra note 8. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id.  Furthermore, in a footnote, 
[t]he Commission then professed to “recognize that these privileges, protections and 
exemptions serve important social interests,” and thus “the Commission does not view a 
company’s waiver of a privilege as an end in itself, but only as a means (where necessary) 
to provide relevant and sometimes critical information to the Commission staff.” 
Dore, supra note 9, at 769 (quoting Seaboard Report, supra note 8). 
 170. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder to All Component Heads and 
United States Attorneys, Bringing Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html [hereinafter Holder Memo]; see 
also Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response to 
the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 935 (2006). 
 171. Brown, supra note 170, at 935–36 (quoting Holder Memo, supra note 170). 
 172. Holder Memo, supra note 170. 
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evaluate the completeness of a corporation’s voluntary disclosure and 
cooperation.”173  In January 2003, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson 
issued a revised version of the Holder Memorandum, entitled “Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations.”174  The criteria concerning the 
waiver of privileges remained in the newly revised Thompson 
Memorandum.175 
In a recent interview, the United States Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York, James Comey, emphasized that in determining the quality of a 
corporation’s cooperation, the government would consider whether the 
corporation disclosed information resulting from its internal investigations and 
whether it waived privilege.176  When asked about the Department’s request to 
waive privilege, Comey replied that “[s]ometimes, in order to fully cooperate 
and disclose all facts, a corporation will have to make some waiver because it 
has gathered the facts through privileged interviews and the protected work 
product of counsel.”177  Although Comey asserts that the intrusion is minimal, 
he admits that waiver may be necessary if the company wants to earn leniency 
through cooperation.178 
The policies of these agencies are essential to this issue because fairness is 
at the heart of the courts’ arguments.179  The opponents of selective waiver 
have determined that it is the corporations that are being manipulative by 
picking and choosing to which adversaries they waive privilege.180  However, 
the policies of the agencies tell a different story.  In what has been called the 
“compelled-voluntary waiver paradox,”181 “[t]he government’s policy of 
 
 173. Id.  The DOJ goes on to assert that “[t]he Department does not, however, consider 
waiver of a corporation’s privileges an absolute requirement, and prosecutors should consider the 
willingness of a corporation to waive the privileges when necessary to provide timely and 
complete information as only one factor in evaluating the corporation’s cooperation.”  Id. 
 174. Thompson Memo, supra note 7. 
 175. Id.  There is one notable difference between the memoranda.  The Thompson Memo’s 
language regarding cooperation effectively increases the significance given to the waiver of 
attorney-client and work-product protections.  Brown, supra note 170, at 936–37; Mitchell, supra 
note 17, at 695 (noting that the Thompson Memo places a “greater emphasis on waiver as a 
condition of cooperation”). 
 176. Shirah Neiman, Corporate Fraud Issues II: Interview with United States Attorney James 
B. Comey Concerning the Department of Justice’s Policy on Requesting Corporations Under 
Criminal Investigation to Waive the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection, 
1456 PLI/CORP. L. & PRAC. 1089, 1093 (2004). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Dore, supra note 9, at 784. 
 180. See supra Part III.A. 
 181. Brown, supra note 170, at 897, 899–900. 
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pressuring companies to waive their attorney-client and work-product 
protections is the real manipulation of the privilege.”182 
“While both the SEC and DOJ insist that waiver of privilege is not 
required for cooperation, corporate attorneys are aware of the well-known 
incentives to cooperate with a government investigation and fear that the 
corporation will be treated harshly if their cooperation is deemed 
inadequate.”183  For example, with the SEC, not only does a corporation lose 
the advantages of cooperation if they refuse to waive privilege, but even a 
“perceived lack of cooperation” could lead to millions of dollars in losses.184  
Although the agency has not penalized a corporation solely for refusal to waive 
privilege, the severity of its policy essentially forces companies to waive 
privilege.185  Courts have concluded that companies should not use privilege 
for any “tactical employment,” yet the SEC uses the same tactical approach 
“when it forces corporations to choose between the Commission’s wrath and 
wholesale disclosure to suing shareholders.”186 
The corporations are certainly feeling the pressure.  In a recent survey of 
inside and outside corporate counsel almost seventy-five percent of both 
categories expressed concern that there was a culture of waiver in which 
government agencies that think it is proper and reasonable to expect companies 
under investigation to broadly waive their privileges.187  About fifty-two 
percent of in-house counsel and fifty-nine percent of outside counsel believed 
that there was a discernible increase in requests for waivers from the 
 
 182. Dore, supra note 9, at 786 (emphasis added). 
 183. Seeman, supra note 142, at 325; see Mitchell, supra note 17, at 696–97 (recognizing that 
although the DOJ memoranda maintain that waiver is not an “absolute requirement” for 
cooperation, in practice the DOJ “has made clear that waiver is an important (and at times, in fact, 
required) condition to be fulfilled.”  Similarly, documents from the SEC indicate that waiver may 
be a necessary factor of “cooperation” with agency investigation in certain cases.  “Even where 
federal investigators fail to deliver formal waiver requests, corporations and their attorneys are 
well aware that an assertion of attorney-client privilege or work product protection may produce 
significant liabilities.”).  As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has 
articulated the “not required” aspect is hard to reconcile considering that government views a 
refusal to waive privilege as an attempt to hide the truth.  Robert A. Del Giorno, Corporate 
Counsel As Government’s Agent: The Holder Memorandum and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 
THE CHAMPION: NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, August, 2003, at 23, available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/ public.nsf/698c98dd101a846085256eb400500c01. 
 184. Dore, supra note 9, at 761. 
 185. See id. 
 186. Id. at 762–63.  This same argument would apply to the DOJ as well since their policies 
are parallel. 
 187. ASS’N OF CORP. COUNS., THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE 
CORPORATE CONTEXT: SURVEY RESULTS 3 (2006), available at http://www.acc.com/Surveys/ 
attyclient2pdf [hereinafter ACC SURVEY]. Only one percent of inside counsel and two and a half 
percent of outside counsel expressed disagreement with that opinion.  Id.  The survey sample 
included over 1,200 respondents.  Id. at 2. 
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government as a condition of cooperation.188  The National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers has emphasized that “[t]he statements on 
cooperation are viewed as going quite far toward effectively forcing a 
corporation to waive the privileged protections in the hopes of receiving 
favorable charging treatment.”189  Outside counsel indicated the DOJ 
memoranda were cited most often when a reason for waiver requests was given 
by the government.190  As a result of these government investigations, fifteen 
percent of companies that were investigated in the last five years mentioned 
that related third-party lawsuits followed.191  These results clearly indicate that 
there is a significant amount of coercion as a consequence of government 
policies regarding waiver.  As one survey respondent explained: “Whether to 
waive the privilege has not been subject to discussion; the only question is how 
far the waiver will go.  And, thus far, there appears to be no limit.”192  
Therefore, if the courts want to look at fairness when considering selective 
waiver, they should also consider the unfair procedures instituted by the 
government to pressure companies into waving privilege. 
Moreover, contrary to what courts have indicated, there is no unfairness to 
civil litigants if selective waiver is allowed.193  As Judge Boggs correctly 
pointed out in his dissent, “[i]t is important to identify the silent premise of the 
court’s argument: private parties would disclose privileged material to the 
government regardless of the existence of an exception.”194  Under normal 
circumstances, the corporations would never be required to release the 
information, and the civil litigant is in the same position that he would have 
been had there been no disclosure at all.195  In other words, the court fails to 
consider that the information would still be privileged if it were not released to 
the government.  “In the run of cases, either the government gets the disclosure 
made palatable because of the exception, or neither the government nor any 
private party becomes privy to the privileged material.”196 
 
 188. Id. at 3.  “Consistent with that finding, roughly half of all investigations or other 
inquiries experienced by survey respondents resulted in privilege waivers.”  Id. 
 189. Del Giorno, supra note 183, at 23. 
 190. ACC SURVEY, supra note 187, at 4. 
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Id. 
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“government agencies routinely ‘blackmail’ companies with threats of indictment, fines, etc., in 
order to get them to waive privilege and take other actions . . . .”  Id. at 11. 
 193. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 194. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 312 (6th 
Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id.; Seeman, supra note 142, at 338.  Additionally, “the underlying facts of the 
privileged communication may be available through other sources which are not privileged . . . .”  
Id. 
 196. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
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Furthermore, with the fairness issue, no court has recognized the most 
significant unfairness in this whole situation, that is, allowing government 
agencies to enter into confidentiality agreements with corporations, only for 
the courts to hold them invalid.  Courts have pointed to the fact that 
corporations have disclosed information to the government in the face of 
virtually unanimous rejection of selective waiver;197 however, courts have 
failed to emphasize that corporations have disclosed information only pursuant 
to a promise by the government that their information would not be disclosed.  
There is an inherent injustice in allowing one branch of government to enter 
into an agreement with a party that is later invalidated by another branch, 
particularly when all the repercussions of a court’s decision will fall only on 
the corporation.  While the courts have chastised the companies for entering 
into agreements when such agreements have been invalidated by other 
jurisdictions, no court has ever discussed the government’s responsibility in 
entering into these agreements.  Courts have expressed concern over 
corporations manipulating the privileges, but—especially in the case of 
confidentiality agreements—it appears that the true manipulation is coming 
from the government.198  Thus, selective waiver is necessary to ensure 
fairness.199 
C. Public Policy Supports Approval of Selective Waiver 
In addition to the fairness concerns listed above, there are formidable 
policy reasons as to why selective waiver should be adopted.  Even some of the 
courts which have rejected selective waiver have admitted that it does 
encourage corporations to cooperate with the government.200  Other courts 
have denied this proposition.201  However, there is more logic on the side of 
the former argument, and the policy arguments in favor of selective waiver far 
outweigh its potential disadvantages. 
As Judge Boggs correctly advocated in his dissent in In re Columbia, 
rejecting selective waiver “unnecessarily raises the cost of cooperating with a 
government investigation.”202  In explaining why selective waiver would 
increase cooperation with investigations, Judge Boggs introduced what he 
described as an “uncontroversial behavioral prediction”: If faced with a 
complete waiver of privilege covering the entire subject matter of the 
 
 197. See, e.g., In re Qwest Communications Int’l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2006).  
 198. See Dore, supra note 9, at 785 (“The true control, and thus the true tactical employment, 
is being effected by the government, not the respective companies it chooses to investigate.”). 
 199. See id. at 786 (arguing that not allowing selective waiver “is an unfair exploitation of 
power by the federal government that has adverse effects on both the attorney-client privilege and 
work-product doctrine.”). 
 200. See, e.g., In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 303. 
 201. See, e.g., In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1192. 
 202. 293 F.3d at 307 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
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disclosure as to all parties, the client would be more hesitant to disclose 
privileged information than it would be if there was no possibility of waiver.203  
This proposition is more logical than any reasoning given by courts that have 
rejected the doctrine.  Corporations under investigation have much to lose, 
especially if faced with the possibility of a third-party suit in addition to the 
consequences suffered as a result of the government investigation.  Thus, it 
makes sense that they would be more willing to disclose information if they 
could receive favorable treatment from the government without handing a 
third-party civil litigant a virtual roadmap for any subsequent lawsuit.  
Selective waiver creates more of a motivation for companies to be truthful with 
the information they disclose as well.  “This may be best explained in the sense 
that the current ‘complete waiver’ waives all privileged information to a third 
party once the information is disclosed, leaving corporations with little 
incentive to be completely honest when disclosing possibly incriminating 
evidence.”204 
The policy considerations behind the doctrine are important to analyze 
because the interpretation of privileges and the determination of circumstances 
under which they can be waived are bestowed to the “reason and experience” 
of the federal courts.205  Thus, in applying this rule, the courts have to consider 
any potential consequences and public policy concerns.206  “These questions of 
‘policy,’ like the deleterious impact of a waiver rule on government 
investigations, are at the heart of the privilege inquiry.”207  It should be noted 
that unless the government obtains a waiver for privileged information of a 
particular company, it may have no other way to obtain such information 
without great expense.208  Therefore, allowing a doctrine which would 
encourage voluntary waivers from companies increases the efficiency of 
government investigations.209 
Generally, it is true that clients should not be allowed to waive privilege as 
to one adversary while maintaining it for another, but the policy behind 
selective waiver overrides this concern.210  Without selective waiver, material 
 
 203. Id. at 309–10. 
 204. Dostart, supra note 3, at 741. 
 205. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 310 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (citing FED. R. EVID. 501). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id.; see generally Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (extensively analyzing policy 
considerations in devising a psychotherapist-patient privilege under federal law). 
 208. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 311 (Boggs, J., dissenting). 
 209. Id.; Brown, supra note 170, at 936 (“Such waivers permit the government to obtain 
statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate individual 
cooperation or immunity agreements.”) (citing Holder Memo, supra note 170); Dostart, supra 
note 3, at 731–32. 
 210. Dostart, supra note 3, at 739–40. 
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that could be disclosed would remain in the dark.211  So, the question at the 
heart of this issue is whether the benefits obtained from prohibiting selective 
waiver outweigh the benefits of the increased information that the government 
would receive if the exception is allowed.212  Judge Boggs is correct in arguing 
that “[a]s the harms of selective disclosure are not altogether clear, the benefits 
of the increased information to the government should prevail.”213 
In support of its argument that selective waiver is not needed to encourage 
companies to cooperate with the government, the Tenth Circuit relied on the 
fact that Qwest disclosed documents to the government in the face of nearly 
unanimous rejection of the doctrine by other circuit courts.214  However, as 
Judge Boggs pointed out, the case against selective waiver is not as 
overwhelming as courts have suggested.215  Particularly, where disclosure has 
been accompanied by confidentiality agreements (as was the case in Qwest), 
several courts have shown a willingness to adopt selective waiver.216  Given 
this, and considering that no Tenth Circuit case had ever addressed the issue, 
this assertion by the Qwest Court is not convincing. 
Moreover, the government agencies themselves have voiced support for 
selective waiver as well.  This is notable because in Qwest the court pointed 
out that the DOJ wrote a brief at the court’s request but took no position on the 
issue.217  In a January 2007 interview, Deputy United States Attorney General 
Paul McNulty voiced support for the doctrine.218  He noted that the danger of 
exposing companies to third-party civil lawsuits “is a significant concern,” and 
he reported that the DOJ was “supportive of the effort to create a limited 
waiver and to amend federal rules to allow it to occur.”219 
 
 211. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 312 (Boggs, J., dissenting).  “The exception aids the 
government in bringing violations of the law to light.”  Id. 
 212. Id. at 311; see Dostart, supra note 3, at 739–40. 
 213. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 311 (Boggs, J., dissenting); see Dostart, supra note 3, at 740 
(arguing that “a decision should not be made against the selective waiver without considering the 
benefits, especially when the benefits of allowing the selective waiver have readily identifiable 
strengths”). 
 214. In re Qwest Communications Int’l, 450 F.3d 1179, 1193 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 215. In re Columbia, 293 F.3d at 307 (Boggs, J., dissenting); see also Kathryn Keneally & 
Kenneth M. Breen, White Collar Crime: New Life for Selective Waiver, THE CHAMPION: 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 42 (commenting 
that recent court decisions have given new hope for selective waiver). 
 216. Keneally & Breen, supra note 215, at 42; see also In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 
230, 236 (2nd Cir. 1993); In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 
In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 217. In re Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1193. 
 218. Pamela A. MacLean, No Comfort from DOJ Waiver Rule: “McNulty Memo” on 
Attorney-Client Privilege Blasted by Critics, 29 NAT’L L.J. No. 20, Jan. 22, 2007, at 8. 
 219. Id. 
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Furthermore, the SEC has asserted that waiver of privilege greatly 
enhances investigative efforts.220  In an amicus brief filed with the Ninth 
Circuit, the SEC argued that confidentiality agreements should preserve 
privilege against third-party civil litigants.221  Relying significantly on Judge 
Boggs’s dissent in In re Columbia, the SEC argued that “[a]llowing parties to 
produce work product to the Commission without waiving work-product 
protection serves the public interest because it significantly enhances the 
Commission’s ability to conduct expeditious investigations and obtain prompt 
relief . . . .”222 
D. Future of Selective Waiver 
Given the importance of the issue as well as the changing landscape in 
regards to corporate corruption, selective waiver is an issue that is likely to 
come before even more circuits.  The recent wave of court decisions rejecting 
selective waiver suggest that it is unlikely that these remaining circuits will 
wholeheartedly accept the doctrine.  However, there is some evidence to 
suggest that courts may be willing to adopt some form of selective waiver 
where a confidentiality agreement was executed between the companies and 
the government.223 
The best hope for corporations will most likely come from the legislature.  
Recent legislation proposed by Congress strongly supports corporations.  
Congress is calling for a new Federal Rule of Evidence which would resolve 
the circuit split in favor of the companies.224  Proposed Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502 would allow selective waiver, such that disclosure to a federal 
agency would not affect waiver to third parties when the corporation has 
executed a confidentiality agreement with the government.225  In addition, on 
December 7, 2006, Senator Arlen Specter introduced the “Attorney-Client 
Privilege Protection Act of 2006.”226  The proposed law would trump the DOJ 
memoranda and make it illegal for any governmental agency to use waiver of 
privilege to determine the level of cooperation for companies under 
investigation.227  Senator Specter took the lead in this area because the DOJ 
 
 220. Dostart, supra note 3, at 740–41 & n. 126. 
 221. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellants at 24, United States v. Bergonzi, 403 F.3d 1048, (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-10511). 
 222. Id. at 23–24. 
 223. See supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 224. Geogory P. Joseph, Privilege Waiver Rule I, 28 NAT’L L.J. No. 35, May 8, 2006, at 15. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S.318, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced 
in the Senate on Jan. 4, 2007); see Press Release, Assoc. of Corporate Counsel, Senator Specter 
Takes Aim at DOJ’s “Thompson Memorandum” (Dec. 7, 2006), available at 
http://www.acc.com/about/press/item.php?key=20061207_6468 [hereinafter Press Release]. 
 227. Press Release, supra note 226.  The Association for Corporate Counsel has spoken in 
support of this bill, declaring that “[they] commend Senator Specter for recognizing that the 
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was not forthcoming with reforms of its own.228  Due to the drastic 
consequences that this Act would have for government investigations, there 
may be a greater call for selective waiver as a middle ground when there is a 
confidentiality agreement; allowing companies to voluntarily aid in 
government investigations without suffering severe repercussions as to later 
civil suits. 
CONCLUSION 
As corporate scandals continue to arise, there will be an ever-increasing 
call for corporations to cooperate with the government.  In most cases, this will 
require that corporations disclose otherwise privileged information.  The 
choice that companies must make carries grave consequences.  Corporations 
have a strong incentive to cooperate with the government, but the cost of that 
cooperation is increasing as courts continue to give third-party civil litigants 
access to disclosed information.  Selective waiver should be allowed when a 
corporation has entered into a confidentiality agreement with the government 
because the doctrine does promote the goals of the attorney-client and work-
product privileges, and the public policy benefits resulting from selective 
waiver greatly outweigh any potential disadvantages.  Government policies 
concerning waiver essentially force corporations to disclose their privileged 
information.  Court rulings further exacerbate the problem by invalidating 
promises made by the government to ensure that corporations will not have to 
turn over their information to third parties.  Therefore, allowing a selective 
waiver when a government agency has entered into a confidentiality agreement 
with a corporation is the only way to ensure that what appears to be 
cooperation is not really coercion. 
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